ABSTRACTThirty years ago, the subfields of emotion and cognition operated relatively independently and the associated science reflected the tacit view that they were distinct constructs. Today, questions about the integration of cognition and emotion are among the most interesting questions in the field. I offer a personal view of the key changes that fuelled this shift over time and describe research from my group that unfolded in parallel and led to the identification of the positivity effect.

In everyday life, people frequently make decisions based on tacit or explicit forecasts about the emotional consequences associated with the possible choices. We investigated age differences in such forecasts and their accuracy by surveying voters about their expected and, subsequently, their actual emotional responses to the 2008 US presidential election. A sample of 762 Democratic and Republican voters aged 20 to 80 years participated in a web-based study; 346 could be re-contacted two days after the election. Older adults forecasted lower (...) increases in high-arousal emotions (e.g., excitement after winning; anger after losing) and larger increases in low-arousal emotions (e.g., sluggishness after losing) than younger adults. Age differences in actual responses to the election were consistent with forecasts, albeit less pervasive. Additionally, among supporters of the winning candidate, but not among supporters of the losing candidate, forecasting accuracy was enhanced with age, suggesting a positivity effect in affective forecasting. These results add to emerging findings about the role of valence and arousal in emotional ageing and demonstrate age differences in affective forecasting about a real-world event with an emotionally charged outcome. (shrink)

In the first section I briefly consider some stituations in which standard desert-claims would be disputed, with the aim of revealing why and by whom they are asserted or denied. Having attained some understanding of the point of different desert-statements, I propose an accound of their content that entails the thesis that statements of positive desert (deserving something desirable) sharply differ in meaning from statements of negative desert (deserving something undesirable), even when expressed in the same form. In the second (...) section I use this ambiguity thesis to argue against an appealing way of defending Hegel's claim that a wrongdoer has a right to be punished and against Kant's defense of the view that there is a duty to punish those who deserve it. I also show how an understanding of negative desert that recognizes the ambiguity thesis enables us to defend the ordinary view of mercy against Kantian criticisms and to reject the popular misconception that mercy is necessarily at odds with justice. In the third section I use the ambiguity thesis to rebut the common claim (found in Mill and Aristotle, among others) that it is unjust for a person to have or be given mone benefits than she deserves. I conclude by showing how an understanding of positive desert that recognizes the ambiguity thesis leads to a rejection both of certain complaints against traditional systems of private property and also of certain moralistic scruples that might give pause to those who acknowledge the moral duty to assist the needy. (shrink)

Provability logics with many modal operators for progressions of theories obtained by iterating their consistency statements are introduced. The corresponding arithmetical completeness theorem is proved.

After discussing the interests that ground the right to democratic political participation, arguments for the disenfranchisement of those who commit serious criminal offenses are examined. The arguments are divided into two groups. The first group consists of arguments that are relatively independent of the justifying aims of punishment. It is conceded that two of these arguments establish that some, though by no means all, serious offenders should lose the vote for a period of time that does not necessarily overlap with (...) the duration of the other sanctions visited upon them. These arguments also imply that the state is justified in attempting to exclude the offenders in question from all forms of political participation, a position that arguably runs afoul of moral limits on punishment. The second group of arguments makes explicit reference to the justifying aims of punishment. None supports the blanket disenfranchisement of felons, though some may justify it in relation to some serious offenders for certain periods of time. All of the arguments supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders are most persuasive on the assumption that they live in reasonably just societies that are genuinely democratic. If that assumption is false or questionable, then it is argued that the force of such arguments may be weakened considerably. (shrink)

A selection of lively debates in the philosophy of time that outline, defend and object to contemporary issues in metaphysics, consciousness and God.

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

There is ongoing ethical and legal debate about withdrawing life sup- port for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Frequently fu- eling the debate are implicit assumptions about the value of life in a state of impaired consciousness, and persistent uncertainty about the quality of life (QoL) of these persons. Yet there are no validated methods for assessing QoL in this population, and a significant obstacle to doing so is their inability to communicate. Recent neuroscientific discoveries might circumvent that problem (...) and help shed light on QoL in DOCs. There is an ethical imperative to prioritize QoL research in this patient population, to provide evidence to inform treatment, research, and end of life decisions. A minimalist and pragmatic model of QoL is proposed, targeting positive and negative affect as domains for which there is po- tential to reach across the communication gap, and restore to these voiceless persons some measure of control. (shrink)

In 1976, Hilary Putnam set forth his model-theoretic argument, claiming that it showed that the semantic realist’s program1 was ‘unintelligible’, since it implied, contra the realist view, that reference is radically indeterminate. Although I find the conclusion that reference is indeterminate unattractive, I argue that the descriptivist position needs to be supplemented with a premise about the sorts of kinds or structure that our world includes. The need for this premise gives a counterintuitive result: the descriptivist account of reference makes (...) the very possibility of determinate reference contingent upon the kinds that happen to make up the world. The need for this premise paves the way towards a new kind of skepticism about what we may and may not assume about the nature of the world. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory has an unexpected application in philosophy of mind, where it is used by the so-called biosemantic program—also called the teleosemantic program— to account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes in a way that conforms to an overarching scientific naturalism. Biosemantic theories account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes by appealing in particular to their evolutionary function, as that function is determined by a process of natural selection. As a result, biosemantic theories have (...) distinct advantages over other theories of mental representation—e.g., Fodor’s causal theory. Foremost among the advantages of biosemantic theories is their ability to account for the possibility of mental misrepresentation. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

Slippery slopes crop up with startling frequency when controversial moral issues are debated. Generally, those who mount this line of argument appeal to some grim, highly undesirable state of affairs which would—they allege—inevitably ensue were society to sanction certain activities. Their reasoning is often fallacious, offering little more than an easy out for those reluctant to address problematic moral issues with the care and honesty they demand.

Patricia White has recently attempted to construct an ethically valid notion of forgiveness that will serve educational purposes and contribute to the moral development of pupils in schools. She distinguishes between a strict view that requires repentance before forgiveness, which she rejects, and a relaxed view that does not require repentance, which she endorses. In this reply I defend the strict view of forgiveness against her criticism and challenge the ethical propriety of the relaxed view. I shall argue that her (...) support for the relaxed view both runs counter to our deepest moral intuitions and serves to undermine the moral law and moral endeavour. (shrink)

Written with the general reader in mind, this collection will prove useful by both scholar and student, and will lead the general reader to encounter one of the ...

The legion of nettlesome, even litigious, issues at the interface of the entwined fields of law, public health, and ethics sorely warrant rapt, informed discussion. Indeed, unabashed confronting of the thicket of thorny issues overfilling the enmeshed, vexing fields of public health, law, and ethics is, in sooth, a Sisyphean task. Distinguished lawyer, experienced public health researcher, and very able writer Lawrence Gostin merits hearty felicitations for his workaday efforts in editing this prolix tome, entitled Public Health Law and Ethics: (...) a Reader, which illumines a quite broad swathe of the complex fabric of issues interconnecting law, public health, and ethics.The excellently edited tome crafted by Gostin is structured as a congeries of reprinted materials, principally academic articles and law cases, presented in excerpted fashion, with expert, insightful commentary provided by Gostin germane to the reprinted materials and generally appertaining to the practice and theory of public health law and ethics. Gostin assigned himself the daunting …. (shrink)

On bioethics related to humanism; papers of a seminar.